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As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE.
REPORTS FOR AUGUST.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has recently decided, in
Globe Publ. Co. v. State Bk. at Crete, 59 N. W. Rep. 683, that.
a suit pending to enforce a right or a remedy•Abatement
conferred solely by statute, is abated by the
unconditional repeal of that statute. This doctrine seems
to be a little too broadly stated, at least under existing condi-
tions in most of the states. If there is another remedy at
law, there is no reason why the proceedings should not be so.
amended as to apply for that remedy.
The Supreme Court of Washington has ruled that wher
a debtor tells a person in whose hands an account has been
Account Stated placed for collection, without making any objec-
tion, that he will pay it, it is a stating of account
between the parties, and the account will bear interest from
the date of the promise: Stickler v. Giles, 37 Pac. Rep: 292;
but the Supreme Court of Alabama seems to have adopted an
unsound doctrine in Loventhal v. Morris, 15 So. Rep. 672,
in ruling that when a merchant renders a statement of goods
sold, which is assented to by the debtor, and payments thereon
are made at various times thereafter, he cannot recover in an
action on an account stated, without proof that a new account,
showing the balance due, had been rendered, and assented to
by the debtor. Head, J., dissented, and with good reason;
for the action could be properly brought on the original
account, and the payments be either allowed as credits, or set
up by the debtor as matter of defence.
The rights of a child adopted under a common law agree-
ment are well supp6rted by the- decision of the Supreme
Adoption, Court of Nebraska in Kofka v. Rosicky,
Rights orfhid 59 N. W. Rep. 788; to the effect that where
a child was given by her parents to her uncle and aunt on an
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agreement that 'they should adopt, rear and educate her, and
at their death leave her all the property they might own,--in
pursuance of which she lived with them till they died, taking
their name, and being taught to consider them her father and
mother, and her real parents her uncle and aunt,--but the
adoptive parents did not devise to her a certain piece of real
estate, the facts amounted to such a part performance of the
agreement as would entitle her to a decree giving her posses--
sion of the land by way of specific performance.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has very properly
ruled that a change in the Christian name of a defendant is.
not such an amendment as will give him the bene-
fit of the statute of limitations: Middlebrook v.
David Bradley*Mfg. Co., 27 S. W. Rep. 169; and the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin holds, in accordance with the weight of'
authority and principle, that when the record in a criminal
case, through the negligence of the clerk, fails to show that
the defendant was present at all times during the trial, it may
be amended to show such facts, on the testimony of the clerk
and the sheriff, after the defendant has sued out a writ of error,
-and at a subsequent term: Hoffman .State, 59 N.W. Rep. 588.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota holds that when all the
orders of an award are to be performed by one party, some of
Arbitration, which are good and some bad, the latter fact will
Award not discharge the party as to those which are
good: Bouck v. Bouck, 5'9 N. W. Rep. 547.
When an insolvent debtor executes a chattel mortgage to
several creditors, with power of sale, conditioned that any
Assignment surplus over their claims shall be returned to the
for benefit of grantor, such an instrument is not to be construed
creditors as a general assignment for the benefit of creditors,
according to the Court of Appeals of Colorado: McCord-
Bragdon Co. v. Garrison, 37 Pac. Rep. 3i; nor is a trust
deed, under such circumstances, as decided by the Court of
Civil Appeals of Texas: Collins v. Sanger, 27 S. W. Rep. 500;
nor, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, will
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such be the effect of several chattel mortgages made simulta-
neously, covering all the property of the debtor, and leaving
other creditors unsecured, though there be an agreement
among the creditor mortgagees to share pro rata in the pro-
ceeds: Smith v'. Phelan, 59 N. W. Rep. 562. A creditor,
however, who after assignment levies upon and sells a part of
the assigned property, apd retains the proceeds, is held by the
Court of Appeals of Colorado not to be entitled to participate
in the assignment: Beifeld v. Martin, 37 Pac. Rep. 32.
According to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the priority
of an attachment is lost when the plaintiff, at the time of
Attachment, placing the writ in the officer's hands, tells him
Priority not to serve it unless some other person gets out
an attachment; and another writ, placed in tle hands of the
,officer before that order is countermanded,will take precedence:
Florsheim Bros. Dry Goods Co. v. Geo. Taylor Com. Co.,
27 S. W. Rep. 79.
The cause of woman's rights has just met with notable
encouragement from the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
In In re Ricker, 29 Atl. Rep. 559, that .court,
Attorneys after a thorough investigation into the nature of
the attorney's calling, his powers, duties, and responsibilities,
has decided, that the vocation of a member of the bar, as an
attorney and an officer of the court, is not a public office,
within the common-law rule which excludes women from
government by withholding electoral and official power, and
that rule does not therefore prevent a woman from being
licensed to practice as an attorney. The reasoning which
supports this opinion is very able and cogent, and would
probably prove convincing to any unprejudiced student of the
question, but most men are unfortunately very strongly preju-
diced on this score, and the weight of authority is rather
against this view: Re Bradwell, 55 I11. 535; Bradwell v.
State, 16 Wall. 130; Re Lockwood, 9 Ct. Cl. 346; Re Goodell,
39 Wis. 232; Robinson's Case, 131 Mass. 376; Re Leonard,
. 2 Ore. 93 ; S. C., 6 Pac. Rep. 426. But it is worth noting
that in all these cases the decision is based more on esthetic
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than legal grounds-such as the impropriety of permitting
women to handle the filth which is so apt to defile a lawyer's
hands in certain classes of cases, and the like; that in most of
the states where the right has been refused, that refusal has
been followed by an express grant from the legislature; and
that the tendency of the more recent cases has been almost
uniformly in favor of the admission of women: Re Mary Hall,
50 Conn. 131; S. C., 21 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 728; Re Kil-
gore, 14 W.N.C. 466; S.C., 17W. N.C. 475, 562; Re
Thomas, 16 Colo. 441; S. C., 27 Pac. Rep. 707; Re Leach
(Ind.), 34 N. E. Rep. 641.
An attorney's lien for services cannot be successfully
asserted against money appropriated to the client by act
of the legislature, while such money is in the custody or
under the control of the state treasurer, by the decision
of the Supreme Court of Nebraska: State ex rel. Sayre v.
Moore, 59 N. W. Rep. 755; and according to the Supreme
Court of Oregon, a district attorney is entitled to but one fee,
where several persons are jointly indicted for the same offence,
and jointly tried: Union Co. v. Hyde, 37 Pac. Rep. 76.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has laid down a very
reasonable rule with regard to membership in a railroad relief
Beneficial association, in Burlington Vol. Relief Dept. v,
Associations White, 59 N. W. Rep. 747, by holding that when
the department, with knowledge of the fact that no formal
application for membership had ever been made,°caused
assessments to be deducted from a supposed member's pay
on the basis of such membership, it was* thereby estopped
from disputing his membership. Of even more importance-
to the beneficial societies of which this country is full, was.
the decision of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,.
in Fawcett v. Supreme Sitting of Order of Iron Hall,
29 Atl. Rep. 614, to the effect (i) that when the certificate
issued promises to pay $iOOO in seven years, on payment
of $2.50 on each assessment, but is silent as to the number
of assessments to be made, the society cannot be said as a
matter of law to be guilty of fraud; and (2) that when a
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beneficial organization doing business in several states
becomes insolvent, and a receiver of all its estate is appointed
by a court of the state in which it was incorporated, a
receiver appointed in one of the other states is not bound
to pay over to him the reserve fund held by its branches
in that state, though claimed by the general receiver for
general distribution among certificate holders, but those funds
should be retained for distribution in their own state, on the
election of the certificate holders to treat the contract as
rescinded and demand a return of the payments thereon.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland refused* to allow a similar
claim made by a general receiver appointed for the state
against local receivers, unless the former could show that
their authority extended to the local branches, and that the
property in the hands of the latter belonged to the Supreme
Sitting and not to the local branches: Weiner v. Sturgiss,
29 Atl. Rep. 613. These decisions, however, are rather
-questionable innovations on the general rule in such cases,
which is, as truly said by Hamersley, J., in his dissenting
opinion in the Connecticut case, that when a corporation is
-chartered by a single state, and does a lawful insurance
business in other states, through agencies, and becomes
insolvent, its assets should be gathered at the domicile and
there distributed according to the principles of equity.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, following the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Nebraska v.
Iowa, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 396, has lately reasserted
the general rule, that when the middle of a stream
is the boundary between two estates, and the water under-
mines the bank on either side, so that it caves in, the owner
of the land stands the loss, and the middle of the stream is
still the boundary, but that if the stream makes itself a wholly
new bed by cutting across a bend or neck, the micdle of the
old bed remains the boundary, though dry: Bouvier v.
Stricklett, 59 N. W. Rep. 55o. And the Supreme Court
of Indiana has ruled, that land described as bounded by the
line of a railroad extended to the line of rails, if the grantor
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-could convey so far, and not simply to the right of way: Reid
v. Klein, 37 N. E. Rep. 967.
The constantly mooted question as to the liability of
common carriers with connecting lines has been considerably
elucidated by the published decisions of the past
month. The Supreme Court of Minnesota has
held that such carriers do not become joint carriers by estab-
lishingjoint or through tariffs or rates, but the one receiving
the goods becomes the agent of the others to contract for
carriage over their respective lines: Wehmann v. Minn.,
St..P. & S. M. Ry. Co., 59 N. W. Rep. 546. The Court of
Civil Appeals of Texas has decided that when connecting
carriers are partners in the transportation of freight, the initial
carrier cannot by contract limit its liability for injuries to
through freight to such injuries only as occur on its lines:
Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wilbanks, 27 S. W. Rep. 302;
and the Supreme Court of. Michigan has taken the ground
that when a shipper knows that his. goods must be delivered
to a connecting line, and agrees that after the goods leave the
receiving road it shall be treated as a forwarder only, the
receiving road will not be liable for a conversion by the
connecting line: McEacheran v. Mich. Cent. Ry. Co.,
59 N. W. Rep. 612. Apropos of the general subject of
liability, the Supreme Court of Minnesota also held, in the
case from that state last cited, that a stipulation that a
-common carrier should be relieved from liability needs a
consideration to make it binding; that the mere receipt of
goods and undertaking to carry them is not such a considera-
tion; and that no abatement or concession in rates, when
forbidden by law, can form a sufficient consideration: Weh-
mann v. R. R., supra. But the Supreme Court of Missouri
has ruled that a statute, which provides that a common
carrier shall be liable for any loss caused by its own
negligence, or that of any connecting carrier, does not prohibit
a carrier from contracting with the shipper against liability.
beyond its own line: McCann v. Eddy, 27 S. W. Rep. 541.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Indiana, the board
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of county commissioners is a corporation, capable of taking
a devise for the establishment of a home for the
Charities benefit of worthy homeless people and orphans:
Comrs. of Rush Co. v. Dinwiddie, 37 N. E. Rep. 795.
The same court has also ruled that in considering the con-
stitutionality of a statute, the court has no right to take into
constitutional consideration its justice, advisability and policy:
Law State ex rel. Smith v. McLellan, 37 N. E. Rep.
799. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire holds that, when
the constitution provides that the hou-e of representatives shall
be judge of the returns, election and qualifications of it mem-
bers, no court is atjthorized to order or advise the clerk as to,
whose name shall be placed on the roll: Bingham v. Jewett,.
29 Aft. Rep. 694; the Supreme Court of Minnesota, that a
statute which requires street railway companies to protect
motormen from the weather by an inclosure for that purpose,
is constitutional: State v. Hoskins, 59 N. W. Rep. 545; and
the Supreme Court of New York, Fifth Dept., that a statute
amending a statute already superseded by an amending statute
is valid when the evident intention was to amend the amenda-
tory statute, and not the amended statute: Peo. v. UpsQn, 29
N. Y. Suppl. 615. With this last case may be compared an
annotation on the effect of an amending statute, in i Am. L.
Reg. & Rev. (N. S.), 566-571.
The statute of frauds continues to receive its full share of
attention. The Supreme Court of Nebraska has decided that
the verbal promise of A to B, to indemnify him if
Contacts he will become surety for C for a debt of the latter
to D, is not a promise on the part of A to answer for the debt
of C within the statute: Minick v. Huff, 59 N. W. Rep. 795;
and the Supreme Court of Michigan, that a written order to.
insert an advertisement is such a written contract as to exclude
evidence of a contemporaneous parol agreement that if the
advertisement did not suit, it could be discontinued at any
time: Cohen v. Jackoboice, 59 N. W. Rep. 665. On the
general subject of contracts, the Appellate Court of Indiana
has held, in opposition to Davis v. Shafer, 5o Fed. Rep. 764,
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that a contract of subscription which provides that the sub-
scribers would pay the builder of a factory a certain amount,
and stating the amount of their respective subscriptions thereto,
is several, not joint: Davis & Rankin Mfg. Co. v. Booth, 37
N. E. Rep. 8 i8. The Supreme Court of Michigan has decided
that an order taken by the plaintiff's agent from defendant for
the purchase of goods from the plaintiff, subject to plaintiff's
approyal, was a unilateral contract, subject to countermand
by defendant at any time before acceptance, though the order
expressly stated that it was not so subject; that a letter
from defendant to plaintiff, reciting that plaintiff had received
at order from defendant for an article, and asking him to hold
it until further notice, was a countermand; and that mailing a
postal to defendant accepting the order, before receiving notice
of the countermand, made the contract complete: Peck v.
Freeze, 59 N. W. Rep. 6oo. The Supreme Court of Indiana,
following the weight of authority and rejecting Paducah
Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 340, has
adopted the doctrine that a water company, that agrees to
supply water to a city to extinguish fires, is not liable to a
private person whose property is destroyed in consequence of
its failure to furnish water, as he is not a party to the contract:
Fitch v. Seymour Water CO., 37 N. E. Rep. 982. The Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin has repeated the well-settled -rule
that a wife may avoid her contract, extorted by a threatened
criminal prosecution of her husband, on the ground of duress:
City Natl. Bk. of Dayton v. Kusworm, 59 N. W. Rep. 564;
and the Supreme Court of Nebraska has ruled that the defence
of insanity may be set up to an action on a contract, without re-
storing what the insane person receives thereunder, if its restora-
ion in specie is impossible: Rea v. Bishop, 57 N. W. Rep. 555.
The court last mentioned has also decided that when the
officers of a corporation are shown to have abused their trust,
to the great damage of the corporation, in theCorporations
interest of another corporation, of which they were
and still are managing officers, any stockholder of the corpora-
tion wronged may bring an action in his own name for the
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benefit of that corporation against the other corporation for-
redress of such grievances and for an accounting between the-
two corporations; and mayjoin both corporations as defend-
ants: Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald & Mallory Constr. Co., 59 N..
W. Rep. 838. The Supreme Court of Michigan has come to
the conclusion that when three persons agree to build a rail-.
road, and form a corporation for that purpose, two of them to
furnish the capital, the third to have general charge of the-
construction, and the road to be sold when built and the pro--
ceeds equally divided, the third person could bind the corpora-
tion for supplies used in constructing the road, though not
acting by any corporate authority: Mich. Slate Co. v. Iron
Range & H. B. Ry. Co., 59 N.W. Rep. 646; and that an injunc-
tion should not issue at the suit of a receiver to enjoin a creditor,.
who has garnished certain funds of the debtor corporation,.
from proceeding with his suit, as he has a right to be heard in.
such proceedings as to his right to the funds garnished: Bald-
win v: Hosmer, 59 N. W. Rep. 669. On appeal from an order
appointing a receiver, the Supreme Court of Washington does;
not consider itself limited to the jurisdiction of the appointing-
court, but will determine whether the order appealed from.
was authorized by the law and the facts: Roberts.v. Wash.
Natl. Bk., 37 Pac. Rep. 26. According to the Supreme Court
of California, an indictment of an officer of a corporation for-
making false entries, if it set out the entries in haec verba, and
allege them to be false, need not state wherein they were false:
Peo. v. Leonard, 37 Pac. Rep. 222; and the Supreme Court:
of Texas has decided that a private corporation may be sued.
for causing death, under a statute which provides that an
action for damages may be brought "when the death of'
any person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, unskill-
fulness, or default of another": Fleming v. Texas Loan
Agency, 27 S. W. Rep. 126.
The Supreme Court of Indiana holds to the doctrine that
a deed to the "heirs" of a living person is void for uncer-
Deeds tainty as to grantees: Booker v. Tarwater,.
37 N. E. Rep. 979; but the Court of Civil.
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Appeals of Texas thinks that a deed of so many acres of
land out of a tract described is not void for uncertainty, but
conveys a proportionate undivided interest: Linnartz v.
McCulloch, 27 S.W. Rep. 279. In the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, when the grantor permits
the use of the land for eleven years in breach of a condition,
with knowledge of that fact, equity should not permit a
forfeiture: Lehigh Coal & Nay. Co. v. Early, 29 At. Rep. 736.
And the Court of Appeals of Maryland has ruled that when
a deed reserves a road through the land coriveyed, in order
to" enable the grantor to reach a highway from other lands
owned by him, the presumption is, in the absence of a clear
indication in the deed to the contrary, that he reseryes only
the use of the road, and not the fee therein: The Redemp-
torist v. Wenig, 29 Atl. Rep. 667.
The Supreme Court of -New York, Fifth Dept., has lately
decided that when a contractor, who is erecting a house,
refuses to allow the owner to enter, during theEjectment
process of construction, for the purpose of in-
specting it while the work is in progress, ejectment will lie:
Smith v. Revels, 29 N. Y. Suppl. 658.
According to the Supreme Court of Kansas, when the
certificate of nomination, in due form, is presented to the-
lections county clerk in time for filing, a failure on his
part to mark it filed, and the loss of it through.
his negligence, will not affect the validity of the nomination:
Rathbum v. Hamilton, 37 Pac. Rep. 20; And the same court
has very justly decided that when all the voters of a township,
used tinted sample ballots by mistake, the official ballots being
all returned unused, and the election was regular in all other
respects, the ballots were properly counted: Boyd v. Mills,
37 Pac. Rep. 16. The number of votes cast at an election,
however, as has been ruled by the Supreme Court of
Nebraska, is not conclusive of the number of qualified voters
in the district: Fullerton v. Sch. Dist., 59 N. W. Rep. 896.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island holds that when a
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person purchases a lot in a platted addition to a city, he
E~minent acquires a private right of way over the streets
Domain thereof; and the fact that such a street is after-
wards taken as a highway does not prevent the owner of the
tot from recovering damages from a railroad company which
closes such street, so as to leave his lot in a cul-de-sac, for the
actual injury to his lot: Johnson v. Old Colony R. R.,
29 Atl. Rep. 594. The Supreme Court of Maryland has
decided that when, in a like case, the original owner of the land
has sold a lot described as abutting on a certain alley,
the alley is dedicated to the public; and an ordinance enacting
that the portion of the alley between lots reserved by her
should be closed, and authorizing her to erect a building
thereon7 shutting off others from access to a street with which
the alley connected, was invalid, as a taking of the easement
of the other lot owners for private use: Van Witson v. Gut-
man, 29 Atl. Rep. 6o8. The Supreme Court of Illinois has
made a similar ruling in Field v. Barling, 37 N. E. Rep. 850,
to the effect that an ordinance granting to private parties the
right to construct for their own use a bridge over a public
alley is invalid, as cities hold the fee of the streets for public
uses only.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Nebraska, that court, on error from a justice of the peace to
'rror and the district court, and then from the affirmance
Appeal of the judgment to the Supreme Court, will only
,consider errors assigned to the district court: Weeks v.
Wheeler, 59 N. W. Rep. 554. The Supreme Court of
Missouri holds that when a cause is reversed and remanded,
with directions to modify the judgment in a certain specified
manner, the'court below has no discretion to open the judg-
:ment in order to adjust rights of parties accrued pending the
:appeal; but that those must be settled by a new suit. All
-that the lower court'can do is to carry out the mandate of the
Supreme Court: Young v. Thrasher, 27 S. W. Rep. 326.
This same court has introduced a dangerous innovation into
.the law of error and appeal, by a divided court, the judges
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standing four to three in favor of the point decided. The
decision is to the effect that when the damages recovered in an
action at law are excessive, the Supreme Court may require
the plaintiff to remit the excess, as a condition of affirmance,
without depriving either party of his right to a trial by jury:
Burdict v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 27 S. W. Rep. 453. The dis-
senting judges were Sherwood, Barclay and Gantt, and that
fact of itself is enough to overrule the majority opinion, even
without the cogent reasoning with which they support their
position. The power of the Supreme Court over damages
that are capable of liquidation is unquestionable; but to,
extend this to damages for a tort, which lie wholly within
the discretion of the jury, has rarely been attempted, and has,
met with deserved failure. With all due respect for that
august body, it is a matter of which it is utterly incapable to
judge properly.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has decided that in an
action on a policy of life insurance, copies of the record of
deaths of the city of Baltimoie cannot be offered
in evidence to show the nature of the disease from.
which the relatives of the insured died, as they are unsworn
statements and hearsay: Met. L. I. Co. of N. Y. v. Anderson,.
29 Atl. Rep. 6o6. This reasoning, however, ought not to.
apply to records made up from the sworn affidavits of the'
attending physicians, as they are in other states. The-
Supreme Court of Michigan has very justly ruled, that as
the statutes and reports of other states are documents, when--
ever the law of a state, as shown by them,; is undisputed as to
the point in question, the court may properly *charge as a fact
that such is the law: Rice v. Rankans, 59 N. W. Rep. 66o;-
and the Supreme Court of Nebraska has adjudged that-
as against strangers thereto, a receipt is incompetent evidence-
of the payments thereby acknowledged, being, so far as they-
are concerned, but the hearsay -declaration of the party who.
made it: Ellison v. Albright, 59 N. W. Rep. 703.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds that the compe-
tency of a five-year-old child to testify is a matter within the-
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discretion of the trial court: State v. Juneau, 59 N. W. Rep.
580; and that a person who claims no interest in the suit,
and through whom neither party claims, is competent to
testify to a conversation between plaintiff's manager and a
deceased defendant: Curtis v. Hoxie, 59 N. W. Rep. 58I.
Somewhat more doubtful is the ruling of the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island, that the defendant to an action by a surviv-
ing partner may testify as to conversations with the deceased
partner, as, the conversations being with the partnership, the
death of the deceased partner is not the death of the other
party within the statute: Clapp v. Hull, 29 Atl. Rep. 687.
There are numerous cases to the same effect; but the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania enunciated a sounder doctrine
when it ruled the opposite in Dick v. Williams, 130 Pa. 41.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota reached a just con-
,clusion in Brown v. Edmunds, 59 N. W. Rep. 731, by decid-
E~xection ing that a watch and chain, habitually carried
upon the person of the debtor, for his own con-
venience, and not used by his household, nor for the benefit
or comfort of the family, is not exempt as "household furni-
ture." Yet one can imagine how Sergeant Buzfuz would
have expatiated on the value of that watch in securing the
proper cooking of soft-boiled eggs, the getting of produce
to the train in time for market, etc., etc.
According to the sound rule adopted by the Supreme Court
of Ohio, when the defendant in a prosecution for forgery
admits the making of the signature, the burden
of proof is not on him to prove that he had
authority, but on the state to prove that he signed the name
without authority: Romans v. State, 37 N. E. Rep. io4o.
See Peo. v. Wiman, 23 N. Y. Suppl. 1034.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Kansas, a creditor,
who, in absolute good faith, takes the property of his debtor
Frudulent at a fair valuation in payment of an honest debt,
conveyance commits io fraud against any one, although the
payment of his debt may absorb the entire property of his
debtor: Hasie v. Connor, 37 Pac. Rep. 128; and according
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to the Supreme Court of Washington, a mortgage given in
good faith to a creditor, by a firm doing a paying business, is
not void as to other creditors because its debts were greater
than its assets, apart from the good-will, when the mortgage
was given: Brookes v. Skookum Mfg. Co., 37 Pac. Rep. 284;
and a mdrtgage given to secure a bona fide debt is valid, by
the ruling of the Supreme Court of Texas, though an ulterior
purpose of the debtor is to prevent the property mortgaged
from being subjected to the claim of another creditor: Haas
-v. Kraus, 27 S. W. Rep. 256; but the Supreme Court of
Missouri has very properly decided that absolute deeds, given
by one banking house to another as security for loans and
discounts, and withheld from record for three years, so as not
to injure the debtor's credit, are, as matter of law, fraudulent
as to subsequent creditors: State Say. Bk. v. Buck, 27 S. W.
Rep. 341. The Supreme Court of Michigan has permitted a
deed, executed by sons to a father, who had great influence
over them, for their interest in certain lands, with the under-
standing that he would only use it to induce their sister to do
likewise, to be rescinded in equity, though the sons were par-
ticipants in their father's fraudulent design: Peek v. Peek, 59
N. W. Rep. 6o4; and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has
held that when the son-in-law and housekeeper of a trustee
purchases lands from one to whom they had been fraudulently
conveyed by the trustee, the mere taking of a deed therefor
from the trustee is not sufficient to charge them with notice 'of
the breach of trust, if the price paid is adequate: Hawley v.
Tesch, 59 N. W. Rep. 670.
The Supreme Court of Michigan holds that a guardian, who
has enough personalty in her hands for the maintenance of
Guardian and her wards, cannot charge their real estate by her
ward contracts for necessaries: Roscoe v. McDonald,
59 N. W. Rep. 603.
A curious question has recently been decided by the Su-
preme Court of California, where the board of directors of the
state prison attempted to close a public highway
running through the prison grounds; and it was
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held that they could not do so, even though it facilitated the
escape of prisoners, because the easement which -the public
have in a highway does not merge in the fee of the servient
estate, when acquired by the state: Peo. v. Marin Co., 37 Pac.
Rep. 203. It might have been urged with equal truth that the-
state in its corporate capacity, as owner* of the prison grounds,
and the public in its. collective capacity, as owner of the ease-
ment in the highways, were in the eye of the law distinct.
entities. The state can sell the grounds used as a prison; it
cannot barter away the easement of the public in the streets.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds that, notwithstand-
ing the married women's acts, the husband may recover to the
Husband and extent that the injury sustained by the wife inca-
Wife pacitates her from performing the duties that
reasonably devolve upon her in the marriage relation, such as
her services and companionship: Omaha & R. V. Ry. Co. v..
Chollette, 59 N. W. Rep. 92 1. This is based on the decision
of the Supreme Court of Iowa, made years ago, in Mewhister
v. Hatten, 42 Iowa, 288.
The wife meets with equal consideration. The Supreme
.Court of Arkansas will permit her to claim a homestead which
she continues to occupy with her family after the husband has
become a fugitive from justice: Hollis v. State, 27 S. W. Rep.
73 ; and'the Supreme Court of Missouri will not allow non-
resident creditors a remedy against a married woman, also
non-resident, which the laws of that state deny to residents,.
on the rather flimsy principle that the lerfori governs as to
remedies: Ruhe v. Buck, 27 S. W. Rep. 412. But by the
lex, lod contractus she was liable to suit; and on the authority
of Hill v. Chase, 143 Mass. 129; S. C., 9 N. E. Rep. 30;
and Baum v. Birchall, 150 Pa. 165; S. C., 24 AtI. Rep. 620;
as well as of the other authorities cited by Sherwood, J., in his
dissenting opinion, the decision seems unsound. The same
court did better when it held, in Porter v. Reed, 27 S. W.
Rep. 351, that married women, though under disability, are
* proper defendants to a suit in equity to prevent multiplicity-
of actions.
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The Supreme Court of Texas seems to stick in the bark
when it claims that a fire insurance policy, containing a clause
that it shall at once become null and void, and the
unearned premiums be returned, if the premises
become vacant without consent of the company, is avoided by
a vacancy of three days, incident to a change of tenants: East
Tex. F. I. Co. v. Kempner, 27 S. W. Rep. 122; but the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska is unquestionably right in deciding
that, when a policy provides that no action shall lie unless
begun within six months after the loss, and that the damages
are payable sixty days after satisfactory proofs' of loss are fur-
nished,.the six months' limitation does not begin to run until
the expiration of the sixty days: German Ins. Co. v. Davis,
59 N. W. Rep. 698.
The Si.preme Court of the United States, over the dissent
of Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Brewer and Jackson, has
Interstate recently decided that the provisions of § 12 of the
Commerce Interstate Commerce Act, authorizing circuit
courts, on refusal of any person to obey a subpoena issued
by the interstate commerce commission, to order such person
to appear before the commission to give evidence, and to
punish a failure to obey' such order as a contempt, are con-
stitutional: Interstate Commerce Commission v. Bruneau,
14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1125. The whole proceeding bears a
suspicious resemblance to an attempt to do an illegal act by
legal means; and it would be hard to find-an analogy to it
that has stood the test of investigation. It is to be feared
that in this, as in so many other recent cases, both in federal
and state courts, the court has been misfed into considering
the end, rather than the means by which it was to be attained.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has allowed itself to be
persuaded into a reaffirmance of the strictly logical and legal,
but wholly inequitable doctrine, that when a judg-
ment is rendered in a suit begun before the term,
its lien relates back to the first day of the term, and is prior
to that of a mortgige executed during the term, but before
the rendition of judgment: Norfolk St. Bk. v. Murphy,
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59 N. W. Rep. 707. To their honor be it said, Ryan and
.Ragan, CC., dissented. If it is really impossible for the
courts to break away of their own motion from doctrines
like these, the legislature should be at once informed and
-convinced of its duty to take the matter in hand.
The same court holds that, when there is a contract be-
-tween the owner of land and another person, by which the
Landlord and latter is to cultivate the land and harvest the hay
Tenant grown thereon for a share thereof, but the relation
of landlord and tenant is not created, and there is no specific
.agreement as to the possession of the land, the parties become'
tenants in common of the crop; and if one seizes the whole,
either before or after severance, and disposes of it in denial of
the other's right, the other may maintain trover for his share:
Reed v. McRill, 59 N. W. Rep. 775. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota has decided that neither a mortgagee in possession,
-nor an assignee of rents growing out of a lease assigned to
him as security, has such an estate as brings him in privity
with the lessee under a lease executed by the mortgagor, so
as to make him liable upon the covenants in the lease: Cargill
v. Thompson, 59 N. W. Rep. 638. The Supreme Court of
Michigan has ruled that when, by the terms of a lease, build-
ings are to be removed by the lessee on expiration of the term,
a refusal to permit their rembval is a conversion: Osborn v.
Potter, 59 N. W. Rep. 6o6; and the Supreme Court of
Nebraska has held that a ratification by the landlord of the
unauthorized act of a tenant in erecting buildings, by allowing
the cost of the buildings as a proper charge against, him on
settlement, will render the estate of the landlord liable to a
mechanics' lien arising out of the improvements: Scroggin v.
Natl. Lumber Co., 59 N. W. Rep. 548. By a decision of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, lessees who are bound to
rebuild can recover the full'value of buildings from a railroad
negligently setting them on fire: Anthony v. N. Y., P. & R.
R. Co., 37 N. E. Rep. 780.
According to the Supreme Court of Michigan, one who has
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cut and rafted logs under a contract, by the terms of which
he is entitled to retain possession until paid for
his services, has a common law lien thereon, if he
complies with the contract; and the fact that the owner
obtains possession will not defeat the lien, if that possession
is tortiously obtained: Haughton v. Busch, 59 N.W. Rep. 62 1.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, after discussing the
* apparently conflicting cases, has arrived at the conclusion
that a delivery of liquor to one who promises
to return it in kind, is not a "sale," if made in
good faith; but if it is a mere subterfuge, it is a sale, within
-the meaning of the statute: Robinson v. State, 27 S.W. Rep.
233. Fairly representative cases are, on the one hand, Com.
v. Abrams, 150 Mass. 393; S. C., 23 N. E. Rep. 53; and on
the other, Gillan v. State, 47 Ark. 555; S. C., 2 S.W. Rep. 185.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has decided that knowledge
that the vendee is selling .liquors illegally is no defence to an
action by the vendor for the price: Gambs v. Sutherland,
59 N. W. Rep. 652; though a contrary doctrine prevails in
'Massachusetts: Graves v. Johnson, 3o N. E. Rep. 818.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, which has been making
law rapidly of late, has ruled that after a contract of hiring
isasterand expires, the law does not imply that the after
Servant services were rendered on the original contract,
so as to exclude parol evidence of different terms: Hale v.
Sheehan, 59 N. W. Rep. 554. The Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas thinks that the legislature has power to declare what
class of employ~s shall thereafter be considered as fellow
servants: Galv., H. & S. F. Ry. Co., 27 S. W. Rep. 426; and
the Supreme Court of California, that the mate of a ship
engaged in carrying freight and passengers between distant
points is a fellow servant of a man employed in the steward's
department to wait on the officers' table: Livingston v. Kodiac
Packing Co., 37 Pac. Rep. 149; though if a mate is not a vice-
principal, it will be hard to define the latter term. Yet the
House of Lords treats the master of a vessel as a fellow
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
servant with the seamen: Hedley v. Pinkney & Sons S. S. Co.
[18941 App. Cas. 222. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, however, holds that an employ6 of a railroad
riding to and from work on a free ticket given him by the
defendant company, is a passenger, not a fellow servant of the
crew, during that ride: Doyle v. Fitchburg R. R., 37 N. E.
Rep. 770. The Appellate Court of Indiana has decided,
rather at variance with the weight of authority, that when a
stone, insecurely placed by the order of a fellow servant, in
charge of the yard, fell on a workman and injured him, the
master was liable for his neglect to provide a safe place to
work: Blondin v. Oolite Quarry Co., 37 N. E. Rep. 812;
and the Supreme Court of Missouri, that if a railroad neglects
its statutory duty to fence its tracks, it will be liable for the
death of an engineer due to a collision with a bull that had
come on the track through a defect in the fence: Dickson v.
Omaha & St. L. Ry. Co., 27 S. W.. Rep. 476.
As usual, the -subject of mechanics' liens bears its share of
fruit. The Supreme Court of Illinois has held, that when a
Mechanics' corporation is a sub-contractor, a notice signed by
Liens it, or its attorney, without the corporate seal, is
sufficient: Carey-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Fullenwider, 37
N. E. Rep. 899; the Supreme Court of Washington, that the
fact that a person entitled to a mechanics' lien assigns his claim
against the owner of, the land as collateral security, will not
defeat his right to claim the lien, as the assignment is a merely
equitable one: Potvin v. Denny Hotel Co., 37 Pac. Rep. 320;
and the Supreme Court of Indiana, that in an action to fore-
close a mechanics' lien, persons to whom the property was
conveyed after record notice of intent to file a lien, and who
claim to be owners thereof, are proper parties: Vorhees v.
Beckwell,-37 N. E. Rep. 8 11. The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, in that mania for spying out unconstitutionality that
seems to afflict it, has lately decided that an act providing that
no contract between the owner and the contractor shall inter-
fere with the right of a sub-contractor to file a lien, unless he
agrees in writing to be bound by the contract between the
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contractor and owner, is unconstitutional, as an unwarrantable
interference with the undefeasable right of acquiring and pos-
sessing property: Waters v. Wolf, 29 AtI. Rep. 646. This
has a very fine sound; but compared with the brief dissenting
opinion of Justice Mitchell, it lacks harmony. In his view, the
act was nothing more than a regulation of future contracts, one
wholly within the power of the legislature. Certainly, it was
not as fundamental a disturbance of the right of acquiring and
possessing property as the act which declared that no ground
rent thereafter created should be irredeemable; or than those
imposing collateral inheritance taxes.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has recently reaffirmed
the doctrine, that the legislature may delegate to a municipal
Municipal corporation power to adopt and enforce ordinances
Corporations of special and local importance, though general
statutes exist relating to the same subject; and that the same
act may constitute a crime against the public law of the state,
and also a petty offence against a municipal regulation; but
that the two offences are different, and either or both may be
punished without violating any constitutional right of the party
accused: City of Monroe v. Hardy, 15 So. Rep. 696.
The United States Circuit Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts, in In re Saito, 62 Fed. Rep. 126, has refused to
naturalize a native of Japan, on the ground that,
Naturalization
being of Mongolian race, -he was not included
within the term "white person:" Rev. Stat. U. S., § 2169.
The same was held as to the Chinese, even before the act for-
bidding their naturalization: In re Ah Yup, 5 Sawyer, 155.
The general rule as to the interpretation of the word "white"
is, that it includes only those who have over 50 per cent. of
white blood in their veins, half breeds being therefore excluded:
2 Kent Corn. 72; Williams v. School Dirs., Wright (Ohio),
578 ; Gray v. State, 4 Ohio, 353 ; Jeffries v. Ankeny, i i Ohio,
372; Thacker v. Hawk, ii Ohio, 377; Lane v. Baker, 12
Ohio, 237; In re Frank Camille, 6 Sawyer', 541 ; S. C., 6 Fed.
Rep. 256. At the same time, a state of affairs that permits
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the most degraded negro to vote, but excludes the members:
of a nation as intelligent as the Japanese, calls loudly for legis-
lative correction.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has decided in Talmage v-
Smith, 59 N. W. Rep. 656, that when a boy goes on a shed
belonging to the defendant, who throws a stick at
Negigence him and puts out his eye, he can recover, though
a trespasser, as he could not anticipate the throwing of the stick;.
and the Supreme Court of Kansas has ruled that the mere fact
that a coal miner, engaged by a mining corporation in sinking
a coal shaft, is a small stockholder in the corporation, will not
prevent him from recovering damages for a personal injury
caused by the negligence of the corporation, as such a stock--
holder has no personal control or management of the coal
shaft, or of the corporation or its property: Morbach v. Home
Min. Co., 37 Pac. Rep. 122.
The law of nuisances has received a valuable addition in the
careful opinion of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Beatrice
Gas Co. v. Thomas, 59 N. W. Rep. 925, which
Nquisance rejects the fallacious doctrine of Brown v. Illius,.
27 Conn. 84, and Ballard v. Tomlinson, 26 Ch. D. 194, hold-
ing that there is a distinction between an injury caused by the
percolation of filth through the ground and that due to the
contamination of a subterranean watercourse, and follows
Kinnaird v. Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468; S. C., 12 S. W. Rep. 937,
to the effect that one who collects injurious or offensive mat-
ters upon his premises, which by percolation, transmission
through subterranean streams or otherwise, pollutes his
neighbor's well, is liable for the damages thereby sustained.
See Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 566; S. C.,
32 W. N. C. 45; 26 Atl. Rep. 644.
The Supreme Court of Florida holds that a suit cannot be
maintained against the sureties on an official bond conditioned
"for faithful collection of taxes and prompt pay-
ment thereof," for fees due a publisher for adver-
ting sales of land for taxes, which had come into the hands
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of the officer; such a withholding of money due being official.
misconduct, but not a breach of the bond: State v. Montague,.
15 So. Rep. 589. And the. Supreme Court of Washington
has decided that a board of county commissioners, having
power to contract for the services of a county physician, has
power to make such a contract for a year, though mem--
bers of the board are about to go out of officein a few days:.
Webb" v. Spokane Co., 37 Pac. Rep. 282.
According to the Supreme Court of Arkansas the service-
of~a summons by the plaintiff's attorney is void, he not being-
a disinterested party: Rutherford v. Moody,.Practice, Civil
27 S. W. Rep. 230; and in the opinion of the'
Appellate Court of Indiana a motion by the plaintiff" for-
judgment non obstante veredicto does not raise the point that:
judgment should be rendered for the plaintiff on the answers.
to interrogatories, notwithstanding the general verdict: Marion.
St. Ry. Co. v. Carr, 37 N. E- Rep. 952.
Criminal practice never fails to furnish something new..
The Supreme Court of California has decided that when,.
Practice, pending a prosecution, the part of the county ins
Criminal which the offence was committed is erected into a.
new county, such new county has jurisdiction of the offence,.
the prosecution in the old county having been dismissed: Peo.
v. Stokes, 37 Pac. Rep. 207; the Supreme Court of Vermont
has ruled, that when the statute does not clearly and definitely-
apprise the defendant of the charge against, him, an indictment
charging the offence in the words of the statute is insufficient:
State v. Fisher, 29 Atl. Rep. 633; the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, that it is within the discretion of the court to
permit a juror to attend his place of business during a criminal
trial: Baker v. State, 59 N. W. Rep.'570; the Supreme
Court of South Carolina, that if, after the jury has been sworn,'
a juror states to the court that he has formed and expressed
an opinion, it is error to let the trial proceed with that juror:
State v. Cason, 19 S. E. Rep. 918; and the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, that when, after a verdict has been announced,.
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recorded, and affirmatively responded to by the entire jury,
the latter is erroneously polled, the separate answers given by
the jurors, if not in accord with the verdict, may be treated as
surplusage: Com. v. Schmous, 29 Atl. Rep. 644.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has made a de-
cided advance in holding that a new trial should have been
granted when, by the voluntary affidavit of a juror, it appeared
that the deponent had told the other jurors facts known to
him prejudicial to the defendant: Ellis v. State, 27 S. W. Rep.
136. This is in direct contravention of the general rule, which
invests the verdict with such absurd sanctity, that a juror
cannot impeach it, even in cases like the present, though he
may testify in support of it: Taylor v. Com. (Va.), 17 S. E. Rep.
8 12; but the Supreme Court of the United States has held
that they can testify to the fact of extraneous influence, but
not to its effect: Mattox v. U. S., 146 U. S. I4O; S. C., 13
Sup. Ct. Rep. 50. There is no reason for blindly clinging to
the old rule; it is as unreasonable as that of nemo audietur
allegans suam turpitudinem, and should have been exploded
with that. The utter absurdity to which it is carried is well
shown by a recent decision of the court of Blair county, Pa., that
a verdict obtained by the toss of a cent could not be disturbed
on the affidavit of a juror to that effect. See The Philadelphia
Record for Friday, August 3 1st.
According to the Supreme Court of Illinois, when a note
provides for compound interest, but the interest is not secured
Promissory by coupons, only simple interest is recoverable:
Notes Bowman v. Neely, 37 N. E. Rep. 840; and a note
given in payment for corporate stock, which recites that the
certificate of stock is to be surrendered on payment of the note,
is not negotiable: Van Zandt v. Hopkins, 37 N. E. Rep. 845.
The Supreme Court of California has decided that a broker's
right to commissions for procuring a purchaser for land under
Real Estate an agreement therefor, is not affected by the fact
Brokers that he knew the principal had title to only five-
sixths of the land, on which account the deal fell through:
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Martin v. Ede, 37 Pac. Rep. 199; but the Supreme Court of
Michigan has ruled that a real estate agent is not entitled to
commissions from the-vendee as agreed on, when the agent
asked the vendee a price greatly in excess of that fixed by the
vendor, and concealed the fact that he had been instructed to
sell at the reduced price: Phinney v. Hall, 59 N.W. Rep. -814.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the
school board of a city has a right to exclude a pupil who will
not submit to be vaccinated during a small-pox
scare: Duffield v. School Dist. of Williamsport,
29 Atl. Rep. 742; but the Appellate Court of Indiana holds
that the board cannot refuse to pay a teacher, employed for a
certain time, for the full period, on the ground that the school
was closed 'part of the time by order of the board of health,
because of the prevalence of a contagious disease among the
pupils, since such closing of the school was not caused by the
act of God: Gear v. Gray, 37 N. E. Rep. 1059; following
Dewey v. Alpena School Dist., 43 Mich. 48o; S. C., 5 N. W.
Rep. 646.
It is also the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
-that when a corporation pays tax on its capital stock, the same
stock cannot be taxed again in the hands of theTaxation
separate holders of the shares: Com. v. Lehigh
,Coal & Nav. Co., 29 Atl. Rep. 664; while according to the
Supreme Court of the United States, a statute, providing that
the rolling stock of a railroad shall be listed and taxed in the
several counties through which it passes,. in the proportion
-that the length of the main track in that county bears to the
main track used and operated by the company, is not invalid,
as requiring an assessment of property outside the state:
Pittsb., C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep.
1114; aff. S. C., 33 N. E. Rep. 432; nor is the assessment of
a road partly within and partly-without the state, by ascer-
taining the value of the whole line, and then determining the
value of that part within the state, invalid: Cleveland, C. C. &
St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. I122; aff. S. C.;
.33 N. E. Rep. 42 1.
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By a recent decision of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,.
a provision on a telegraph message that the company shall be
Telegraph liable only for the cost of transmission, unless the
Companies message is repeated, is waived if the sender, some
time after sending the message, suggests to the agent that it
be repeated, and the agent says that this would be useless, as
the message had gone through "all right:" West. Union Tel..
Co. v. Reeves, 27 S. W. Rep. 3 18; but the Appellate Court of
Indiana holds that a telegraph company is not liable to a.
penalty for failure to transmit messages impartially, when it
inadvertently receives a message for transmission to a point at
which it has no office: Peterson v. West. Union Tel. Co.,.
37 N. E. Rep. 8io.
The Privy Council of England has lately rendered an inter-
esting trade-mark decision, on appeal from New South Wales,.
in Natl. Starch Mfg. Co. v. Munn's Pat. Maizena.
Tra de-Mark & Starch Co. [1894] App. Cas. 275. The appel-
lants had invented the word "Maizena" for their product in
1856, but had never registered it in the colony until 1889,.
although they had registered it and enforced it in other coun-
tries, and had allowed it to be used as a term descriptive of
the general article rather than of their own manufacture. It
was accordingly held that the word had become publicijuris,
and could not be registered as a trade-mark; and further, that
as the respondents, in applying the word to their own manu-
facture, did not try to pass it off as that of the appellants, by
the use of labels and packets calculated to deceive the public
on that point, but on the contrary stated the .name of the
maker, the place of manufacture, and other necessary particu-
lars, they would not be restrained from using it.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has ruled that when a-
vendor sells and delivers goods at prices and. on terms of
Vendorand payment definitely fixed by the contract, but re--
Vendee tains the right to elect to take back the goods
remaining unsold by the vendee, as the property of the vendor,.
the latter is not the owner of the goods until after the actual
exercise of such election, and creditors of the vendee, who.
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attach those goods prior to any election by the vendor, acquire
a valid lien thereon: Moline Plow Co. v. Rodgers, 37 Pac.
Rep. i i i, But according to the Court of Errors and Appeals
of New Jersey, when goods are sold on the terms that the
vendee shall give notes for the purchase price, but that the
title shall remain in the vendor until a mortgage given to
secure the notes or the price is paid, and no rights of innocent
third parties intervene, the title continues in the vendor, though
he recovers judgment on the notes, and after such judgment
he may reclaim the goods by replevin: Campbell Print. Press
& Mfg. Co. v. Rockaway Publ. Co., 29 Atl. Rep. 68I.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire holds that specific
bequests to named legatees, to take effect at the death of
testator's wife, vest at the death of testator: HaltWills
v. Wiggin, 29 Atl. Rep. 671; and the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has decided that if no trustees are.
appointed, a proviso that an absolute bequest of a life estate
shall not be liable to the debts of the donee will not protect it.
from sale by creditors (which is a most wise limitation of the
doctrine of spendthrift trusts): Ehrisman v. Sener, 29 Atl.
Rep. 719; and that the word "between" in reference to two.
classes of devisees will make a distribution per sz'rpes, and not.
per caita, in spite of the frequent confusion of that word.
with the word "among:" Ihrie's Est. (Levy's App.), 29 Atl
Rep. 750.
